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BOOK REVIEW
IN SPITE OF MEESE
LAWRENCE C. A4RHALL*
IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE. By Michael L. Radelet, Hugo Adam Bedau, and
Constance E. Putnam. Northeastern University Press 1992. Pp.399.
"Suspects who are innocent of a crime should [have the right to have a lawyer
present during police questioning.] But the thing is, you don't have many sus-
pects who are innocent of a crime. That's contradictory. If a person is innocent of
a crime, then he is not a suspect."
Attorney General Edwin R. Meese, quoted in
U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Oct. 14, 1985, at 67.
America's primary response to the perceived dramatic increase in
violent crime over the past decades has been to increase dramatically
the level of punishment meted out on those who are convicted of
these crimes. In many states, legislatures have passed mandatory mini-
mum sentencing laws requiring judges to sentence all convicted of-
fenders to severe sentences-no matter what the circumstances of the
offense or the offender.1 On the federal level, the sentencing guide-
lines have created a new sentencing system which has served not only
to cut down on judicial sentencing discretion, but also to enhance the
severity of sentences. 2 And the recently enacted crime bill adds more
than fifty new crimes to the list of federal crimes eligible for the fed-
eral death penalty, and creates a new "three-strikes-and-you're-out"
provision, which requires mandatory life sentences for three time
recidivists.
3
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. My thanks go out to Ethan
Cohen, David Fisher, and Katrin Knudsen for helpful assistance on this essay. The essay is
dedicated to my friend and client Rolando Cruz, with the fervent hope that he will soon
join the ranks of those whose innocence has been officially declared.
1 See generally Gary Lowenthal, Mandatoy Sentencing Laws: Undermining The Effectiveness
of Determinate Sentencing Reforms, 81 CAL. L. Rxv. 61 (1993).
2 See generally DanielJ. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681 (1992).
3 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. At least 30 states are examin-
ing the "three-strikes-and-you're-out" idea, "backed by Governors as disparate as Republi-
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There is, of course, much room for debate about the sensibility of
using enhanced sentences to cure the perceived explosion of violent
crime on our streets. 4 In the course of that debate, however, another
major issue merits consideration. It is critical to consider whether the
same spirit that is fueling the movement to stiffer penalties is also
leading to a society which is less zealous in maintaining safeguards
against the conviction of the innocent. It is entirely predictable that
the more a society feels threatened by criminal activity, the more se-
verely it will deal with those whom it convicts, and the more willing it
will be to convict those whom it suspects. And it is entirely predictable
that, once having convicted an individual, such a society might be in-
creasingly unwilling to consider claims that it has convicted an inno-
cent person. 5
Ironically, then, the very same "tough on crime" attitude that
makes it more likely for individuals to be wrongly convicted, also
makes it less likely for society to remedy that wrong. Whatever one
makes of the phenomenon of enhanced sentences, the concomitant
callousness towards the risk of erroneously convicting the innocent
has severe social and constitutional implications. There could not,
then, be a more opportune time for the publication of In Spite of Inno-
cence, by Hugo Bedau, Michael Radelet, and Constance Putnam.
I. STUDYING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE
Building on a study that Bedau and Radelet published in the
Stanford Law Review in 1987,6 In Spite of Innocence describes 416 cases in
can Pete Wilson of California and Democrat Mario Cuomo of NewYork." Richard Lacayo,
Lock 'Em Up, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 52.
4 Unfortunately, this debate is unlikely to be particularly substantive in an era in which
being "tough on crime" has replaced being "tough on communism" as the patriotic slogan
of the day. For example, when Assistant Attorney General Phillip Hermann left the Justice
Department because of serious concerns over the sensibility of the crime bill, James
Carville, an adviser to the President, declared: "I wish we could get this guy out there every
day. I mean, I like nothing better than a guy going to teach at Harvard saying, 'I left this
administration because it's just too tough on crime.'" Quoted in Nat Hentoff, Crimes Against
Common Sense, WAsH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1994, at A25.
5 For example, in response to this climate of terror, it is not surprising that the United
State Supreme Court has upheld a Texas rule of procedure which bars courts from consid-
ering new evidence of innocence-even in a capital case-that is uncovered more than 30
days after conviction. According to the Court: "we cannot say that Texas' refusal to enter-
tain petitioner's newly discovered evidence eight years after his conviction transgresses a
principle of fundamental fairness 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.'"
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 866 (1993). On one level, it is obvious that any court
that tolerates the death penalty would have to decide Herrera the way in which the Supreme
Court did. This is because every state that carries out the death penalty functionally imple-
ments a similar rule: the execution cuts off the right of the convict to present new evidence
of innocence.
6 Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital
262 [Vol. 85
REVYEW ESSAY
which defendants convicted of "capital or potentially capital crimes" 7
have later been found to be innocent. Unlike the Stanford study
which was geared toward legal and academic audiences, In Spite of In-
nocence is written to appeal to a general audience and contains thir-
teen chapter-length studies of specific cases among the 416.
The authors' criteria for including a case on their list is, in some
ways, quite demanding. For example, they excluded cases in which
the defendant caused the death of a person, but should not have been
convicted of murder because he acted in self-defense, was provoked,
or lacked the requisite mental state to be guilty of that crime. Nor are
they concerned with procedural defects leading to convictions. In-
stead, they are concerned with cases in which the defendants were
completely uninvolved in the crime for which they were convicted-
what they call "wrong-person convictions.""
The most difficult methodological challenge facing Radelet,
Bedau, and Putnam was developing standards for deciding whether to
include a case as a wrongful conviction. Predictably, the method they
chose is controversial. They rely on evidence of innocence that falls
into two categories: "official judgments of error" and "unofficial
judgments."
About ninety percent of the cases in Radelet, Bedau, and Put-
nam's study involve what they call "official judgments of error."9 By
this they mean official commutations or pardons; an award of indem-
nity (by the legislature or the courts) to the convicted defendant after
release; the reversal of a conviction combined with a prosecutor's de-
cision to drop charges against the defendant; or reversal of a convic-
tion followed by acquittal. They do not include every case fitting these
criteria on their list. A prosecutor's decision to drop charges after a
reversal of a conviction may have nothing to do with an official recog-
nition of innocence, but may relate simply to the unavailability of key
prosecution witnesses. So, too, the naked fact that a governor has
granted a pardon or clemency does not provide conclusive evidence
of innocence. Thus, the authors exercise theirjudgment based on the
facts of each case and explain that "the more of these official actions
there are in a given case, the more complete is the evidence of official
belief in the defendant's innocence-and, to that extent, the more
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987). The Stanford study, in turn, grew out of earlier works of
Hugo Bedau dating back to the 1960s. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, Murder, Errors ofjustice
and Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALrY iN AMElICA 434-54 (HA. Bedau ed. 1964).
7 Of the 416 cases that the book describes, approximately 150 involve defendants sen-
tenced to death for first-degree murder;, a few involve defendants sentenced to death for
rape; and the remainder involve defendants sentenced to life in prison for murder.




compelling the inference that the defendant really is innocent."10
The remaining ten percent of the cases in the study involve "un-
official judgments" of error. In these cases, Radelet, Bedau, and Put-
nam rely on their ability to convince the reader that a miscarriage of
justice has occurred, even though there has been no official action
that supports the authors' conclusion. Some of these cases involve
defendants who have been executed and, therefore, have no mecha-
nism for seeking official exoneration." Others involve defendants
who continue to be imprisoned despite evidence that convinces the
authors that they are factually innocent.
In a great many of these cases, the authors are exercising their
own judgment in concluding that the -defendant has been wrongly
convicted. This subjectivity has been the focus of intense criticism
from those who view Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam's conclusions as
posing a threat to America's willingness to stomach a death penalty in
which innocent people may be executed.12 Most notably, shortly after
the publication of Bedau and Radelet's Stanford Law Review Article,
two Assistant Attorney Generals in the Meese Justice Department, Ste-
phen Markman and Paul Cassell, published a rebuttal to Bedau and
Radelet's study in which they dissected many of the cases and argued
with Bedau and Radelet's conclusions about many specific defend-
ants.' 3 According to Markman and Cassell, "[t] he overwhelming prob-
lem with the Bedau-Radelet study is the largely subjective nature of its
10 Id. at 17.
11 Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam state that " [ t] o the best of our knowledge, no state or
federal officials have ever acknowledged that a wrongful execution has taken place in this
century." Id. at 18. Perhaps the closest anyone has come is Massachusetts Governor
Michael Dukakis's 1977 declaration of "Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti Memorial
Day," to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Sacco and Vanzetti's execution. Even
then, though, Dukakis stated that "although he took no stand on whether the two were
guilty or innocent, he wanted to remove 'any stigma or disgrace from the names of the
families and descendants and so from the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.'"
See FRANcis RUSSELL, SACCO & VANZETr: THE CASE RESOLVED 8 (1986).
12 In announcing his new position that capital punishment is unconstitutional, Justice
Blackmun mentioned the risk of executing the innocent as one of the many points that has
changed his thinking on the issue. Citing the earlier work of Bedau and Radelet, he writes
that "[e]ven the most sophisticated death penalty schemes are unable to prevent human
error from condemning the innocent. Innocent persons have been executed, see Bedau &
Radelet, supra note 6, at 173-79, perhaps recently, see Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853
(1993), and will continue to be executed under our death penalty scheme." Callins v.
Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of cert.). For
another recent collection of cases involving 48 wrongful convictions in capital cases, see
Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken Executions, Staff Report by The
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); see also MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY (1991) (collecting cases). For a dated
but classic work on the subject, see EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
13 See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1989).
264 [Vol. 85
REVIEWESSAY
methodology and therefore of its conclusions."14 They therefore con-
cluded that:
a neutral observer is entitled to be skeptical that this study contributes to
a better understanding of the prevalence of error in the administration
of the death penalty. The use of such questionable methodology invites
readers to suspend use of their critical faculties and simply accept the
results of this study on faith.' 5
This criticism is valid-to a point. Without producing a multi-
thousand page tome, In Spite of Innocence could not possibly provide
elaborate detail about each of the cases that the authors believe qual-
ify as miscarriages of justice. Instead, the initial study and In Spite of
Innocence provide a detailed discussion of a sampling of cases to give
the reader a sense of the kinds of standards that the authors use to
assess whether a miscarriage of justice has taken place. With respect
to these cases-thirteen chapter length case studies in the book which
make up over 250 of the book's 390 pages-the reader is not asked to
simply take Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam's word for the fact that a
miscarriage of justice occurred. Rather, most of the study and (even
more so) the book is about the telling of stories16-stories about the
evidence that led to convictions, and stories about the evidence that
led the studies' authors to conclude that the convictions constitute
miscarriages of justice. Neither the initial study nor the book repro-
duces the entire trial transcript and every document and exhibit rele-
vant to a case. But they do provide enough information to allow the
reader to determine whether the authors have reached a reasonable
conclusion that these thirteen cases represent miscarriages of
justice.'
7
If readers are left unpersuaded by these case studies, then they
should most certainly be dubious about the index of 403 additional
cases which the authors claim constitute wrongful convictions. If,
however, they are persuaded by the thirteen case studies, then they
may find it reasonable to conclude that Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam
are using sensible standards and are arriving at sound conclusions.
Readers may still not want to declare on faith that they agree with
each of the 403 indexed cases, but they will surely conclude that there
14 Id. at 126.
15 Id. at 128.
16 "Everyone knows that a good story is more gripping than the best sociological re-
search or philosophical analysis." RADELET E" AL, supra note 8, at ix-x.
17 Markman and Cassell have suggested that Bedau and Radelet's conclusions should
be suspect because Bedau and Radelet both "strongly support abolition of the death pen-
alty." See Markman & Cassell, supra note 13, at 128 n.41. It must follow, then, that
Markman's and Cassell's criticism of Bedau and Radelet should be met with similar suspi-
cion in view of Markman's and Cassell's zealous support for the death penalty.
1994]
LAWRENCE C. MARSHALL
are many cases of wrongful convictions. Personally, I find Radelet's,
Bedau's, and Putnam's accounts quite compelling, but readers should
not take my word on faith any more than they should blindly adopt
the position of Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam, or Markman and Cassell.
They should read the book and reach their own conclusions.
II. WHAT Do THESE STORIES TELL Us ABour CAPIrrAL PUNISHMENT?
In Spite of Innocence and the study behind it are sure to play promi-
nent roles in future debates about the death penalty. Within that de-
bate, the important question is not whether each of the 416 cases
discussed in In Spite of Innocence actually belongs on the list.18 Rather,
the question is what to do with the obvious fact-a fact that Radelet,
Bedau, and Putnam have driven home forcefully-that miscarriages
of justice occur in capital cases.' 9
Opponents of the death penalty have long argued that human
fallibility20 in the administration of any system, including capital pun-
18 The list is, in any event, far from complete. One of the most glaring omissions is the
case of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter, the former top contender for the middleweight boxing
crown who spent more than nineteen years in prison before he was granted habeas corpus
relief, and charges against him were dropped. For an extraordinarily moving account of
this case, see SAM CHArrON & TERRY SWINTON, LAZARUS AND THE HURRICANE (1991). Mr.
Carter now lives outside of Toronto, Canada, and is Executive Director of the Association
in Defense of the Wrongfully Convicted, a group which works to secure the freedom of the
wrongly convicted.
19 Of the more than 400 cases of wrongful conviction that the book discusses, 23 are
cases in which the defendant was actually executed. It is tempting to argue that this rela-
tively small number shows that the system generally works and that even if a significant
number of innocent people are sentenced to death, they are virtually always exonerated
prior to execution of the sentence. Before one reaches that conclusion, though, it is im-
perative to think about why very few cases of wrongful conviction are likely to turn up after
an individual is executed. As Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam note, this small number of cases
"is an indication not of the fairness of the death penalty, but rather of its finality." RADELET
ET AL., supra note 8, at 273.
As long as a defendant remains alive, he, his lawyers, and the activists working on his
behalf have the ability and incentive to bring forth the proof of his innocence. The gov-
ernment, moreover, generally provides some forum (be itjudicial or executive) for consid-
eration of that evidence. Once the defendant has been executed, however, these
opportunities and incentives to establish the defendant's innocence all but disappear.
There is no governmental forum for asserting the innocence of the executed. And the
defendant can no longer use his voice to declare his innocence and help marshal the
necessary proof or media investigation to establish the error of his conviction. The lawyers
and activists remain alive, but once the defendant has been executed, there are other cli-
ents and other causes that cry out for their attention. As Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam write
with respect to the lawyers for James Adams, a man who was executed for a crime they
conclude he did not commit: "Once Adams was dead, his attorneys had to turn their full
attention to the plight of other death row clients. Time spent re-investigating the circum-
stances of the ... murder in the hope of vindicating the late James Adams was time denied
to clients still alive but facing the electric chair." Id. at 10.
20 As Bedau and Radelet demonstrate, miscarriages ofjustice do not always come about
[Vol. 85
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ishment, should preclude human beings from carrying out the ulti-
mate penalty. Indeed, the closing words of the text of In Spite of
Innocence are the oft-quoted words of the Marquis de Lafayette: "Till
the infallibility of human judgment shall have been proven to me, I
shall demand the abolition of the death penalty."21 Others counter
that a society must constantly make decisions that lead inevitably to
the death of innocent individuals. For example, society continues to
build high-speed highways and allow airplanes to fly, even though it is
a virtual certainty that lives will be lost in highway accidents and air-
plane crashes. 22 This is done because society deems the benefits of
quick travel to outweigh the costs of the innocent lives that are lost.
Similarly, even though it is clear that any system of criminal justice will
erroneously imprison some individuals, society does not consider this
a serious argument against imprisoning people, because the benefits
of imprisonment clearly outweigh its costs. So, too, proponents of
capital punishment argue, the benefits of the death penalty suffi-
ciently outweigh the fact that innocent lives might be lost through its
use. Thus, in recent testimony before Congress, Paul Cassell cited
three benefits of the death penalty-incapacitation, deterrence, and
just punishment-which in his view outweigh any costs associated with
executing the innocent.
23
Whether the purported benefits of the death penalty outweigh its
inevitable price is an issue that cannot be evaluated based only on lists
of innocent people that have been executed. Theoretically, one could
convince Paul Cassell that 1000 innocent people have been executed
in the past year alone, and he could still argue that the advantages of
capital punishmentjustify its cost. The debate over the death penalty
is not, therefore, won or lost just on the proof that there are errone-
because of fallibility, in the sense that the term is used to connote "innocent mistakes."
Take, for example, the case of Clarence Brandley, who was sentenced to death for the rape
and murder of a teenage girl in Texas. Brandley and anotherjanitor named Henry Peace
had found the victim's body, and the police concluded that one of them had committed
the crime. According to Peace's later testimony, the officer interviewing the two janitors
,said: "One of you two is going to hang for this." The officer then turned to Brandley and
added: "Since you're the nigger, you're elected." I& at 121. More recently, a former West
Virginia state police chemist was indicted for fabricating inculpatory testimony in more
than 100 cases. See Police Chemist Surrenders in Perjury Case, N.Y. TiMas, Aug. 5, 1994, at 14.
21 RADELET Er AL.., supra note 8, at 281.
22 Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam reply to this argument by suggesting that, unlike drivers
on highways, innocent individuals condemned to death have not necessarily consented to
risk by engaging in dangerous activity. Id. at 276. This answer is not very satisfying, given
'the fact that highway accidents also kill pedestrians, and that airplanes sometimes crash
,into houses.
, 23 See Hearings on the Anti-Crime Legislation Before the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Crime, Comm. of theJudiciay, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Paul G. Cassell).
See- also Markman & Cassell, supra note 13.
1994] 267
LAWRENCE C. MARSHALL
ous convictions, or on the evidence that there are a substantial
number of them. Rather, the debate turns much more on the argu-
ments about capital punishment's contribution to incapacitation, de-
terrence, and just punishment, and on religious and moral views
about the State's authority to intentionally take a human life. Still, to
the extent that people like Cassell claim to support the death penalty
based on the kind of cost-benefit analysis described above, they should
welcome the development of data about the level of erroneous execu-
tions-unless, of course, the point is to look at the purported benefits
without ever considering the costs. Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam's
study is surely not conclusive on the debate. But it is consequential.
There is another sense in which In Spite of Innocence is an impor-
tant contribution to the public and political debate over the death
penalty. Supporters of the death penalty have learned how to use
storytelling as an effective tool to further their goals. By describing in
great detail the heinous crime for which a defendant has been con-
victed, death penalty proponents know they can trigger an intense
emotional reaction that makes the listener more willing to accept the
conclusion that the death penalty is appropriate, either as a general
matter, or in a particular case.24 Those who are more dubious about
the death penalty are severely handicapped here. They can describe
the hideous process of execution, but even the most graphic descrip-
tion of the plight that awaits a convicted killer is unlikely to invoke
much passion when compared to the fate suffered by an innocent
victim.
Consider the following exchange between Justices Blackmun and
Scalia. In the opinion announcing his view that the death penalty is
unconstitutional, Justice Blackmun described death by lethal
injection:
On February 23, 1994, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Bruce Edwin Callins
will be executed by the State of Texas. Intravenous tubes attached to his
arms will carry the instrument of death, a toxic fluid designed specifi-
cally for the purpose of killing human beings. The witnesses standing a
few feet away, will behold Callins, no longer a defendant, an appellant,
or a petitioner, but a man, strapped to a gurney, and seconds away from
execution.
2 5
Justice Scalia countered as follows:
Justice Blackmun begins his statement by describing with poignancy the
24 See Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases
from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 161 (1990). As West explains, these
narratives typically "are not relevant, by any stretch of the legal issues raised on appeal." Id
at 171.




death of a convicted murdered by lethal injection. He chooses, as the
case in which to make that statement, one of the less brutal of the
murders that regularly come before us-the murder of a man ripped by
a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly, with no opportunity to prepare
himself and his aff-airs, 26 and left to bleed to death on the floor of a
tavern. The death-by-injection which Justice Blackmun describes looks
pretty desirable next to that. It looks even better next to some of the
other cases currently before us which Justice Blackmun did not select as
the vehicle for his announcement that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional-for example, the case of the 11-year-old girl raped by four men
and then killed by stuffing her panties down her throat.... How envia-
ble a quiet death by lethal injection compared with that!
27
It would appear that this is a competition that death penalty propo-
nents will win every time.
What Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam have provided, however, is an-
other type of story that is relevant to the death penalty debate. The
public might not care about Bruce Callins's lethal injection, but per-
haps it does care about the fact that Randall Dale Adams-a man as
innocent as Bruce Callins's victim-was once himself within three
days of lethal injection. (Adams was ultimately exonerated after the
true killer confessed to a national audience in the film "The Thin
Blue Line," and his story is one of the thirteen in-depth case studies
contained in In Spite of Innocence.)28 And the public may well be
moved by the story of Gus Langley, who at one point was so close to
death that his head had been shaved in preparation for the electric
chair, but was later found to be innocent, and was released.
29
The gripping accounts of wrongful convictions that the book
presents will surely repulse and outrage the reader in as dramatic a
fashion as Justice Scalia's account of the awful death suffered by the
eleven-year-old victim in the case he described. As a matter of story-
telling, Randall Adams's story, as well as the others that Radelet,
Bedau, and Putnam have presented, provides useful tools in revealing
26 The death of the victim in the Callins case is an awful tragedy, whether the death was
instant or not. One cannot but wonder, though, whetherJustice Scalia would consider the
murder even more heinous had the victim been given a year's notice that he would be
shot, thus affording him the "opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs." Cf People v.
Lucas, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1023 (Ill. 1989) ("brutal or heinous" aggravating factor not satis-
fied where victim's death was instantaneous); Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla.
1975) (element satisfied even though victim was killed instantly by gunshot wound); see
generally Richard A. Rosen, The Especially Heinous Aggravating Circumstance In Capital Cases:
The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941 (1986).
27 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring with the denial of
cert.), (footnote added).
, 28 See RADEr r As., supra note 8, at 60-73. For an excellent account of Adams's jour-
ney to freedom, see RANDALL DALE ADAMs, WiLLIAM HOFFER & MARILYN MONA HOFFER,
ADAMs v. TEXAs (1991).
29 RAD=.aT ar E.., supra note 8, at 275; see also id. at 214-15 (discussing Langley case).
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a side of the death penalty debate that is often obscured by the details
surrounding the victim's tragic death.
III. CHANGING ATrITUDEs ABOUT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS.
Ultimately, In Spite of Innocence and other books and films on the
subject of wrongful convictions are unlikely to have direct impact on
the broad question of whether the death penalty should be abolished
outright. Rather, their real potential for impact is on a variety of less
general, but intensely important questions and attitudes relating to
the workings of our criminal justice system. Specifically, works such as
In Spite of Innocence can have vital effects on the ways in which players
at virtually every stage of the system envision their roles. The risk of
erroneous conviction and execution may not be strong enough to
convince the public or its lawmakers to abandon capital punishment,
but it may well serve to prompt many individuals to take fresh looks at
their attitudes toward the specific roles they play in the process.
Imagine two communities, the citizens of which hold views about
the criminal justice system at extreme points in the spectrum. In one
community, called Optiville, the public, the legislators who draft the
statutes, those who enforce the laws, those who serve on juries, and
those who act as judges believe that innocent people are never, or at
least very rarely, criminally prosecuted, much less convicted. They be-
lieve that all police and prosecutors are honest and virtually infallible,
that the prosecution does not present perjured testimony, and that
the prosecution's eyewitnesses do not make mistakes. In sum, they
agree with the former chief law enforcement officer of the United
States, Edwin Meese, who stated that "if a person is innocent of a
crime, then he is not a suspect,"3 0 much less a defendant or convict.
By contrast, in the other community, known as Pessivile, the public,
the legislators who draft the statutes, those who enforce the laws,
those who serve on juries, and those who act as judges believe that
innocent people are criminally charged, and even convicted, with a
great deal of frequency.
It is fair to assume that people in Optiville will view their roles
quite differently from their counterparts in Pessiville. Ifjurors in Op-
tiville believe there is virtually no risk of wrongful or erroneous charg-
ing and prosecution, then they can feel rather confident in believing
the testimony of all prosecution witnesses and trusting, more gener-
ally, that the prosecution would not be charging an innocent person
in the first place. So, too, judges in Optiville would have little reason




to scrutinize prosecutors' conduct, or to question juries' guilty ver-
dicts. As for the lawmakers in Optiville, what possible reason would
they see to devote resources to resolving post-conviction claims of in-
nocence when those in Optiville are sure that innocent people are
never (or hardly ever) convicted? And governors of Optiville would
be quite loathe to grant executive clemency on the basis of innocence,
when everyone is confident that the court system works so well.
In Pessiville, the population's attitudes toward these matters are
dramatically different. In Pessiville, jurors are very dubious about the
police and prosecutors, and jurors view their role as protecting the
public from the abuses of power to which these law enforcement offi-
cials are often prone. They believe that prosecution witnesses com-
mit perjury with some frequency, and that eyewitnesses often make
mistakes. Judges in Pessiville feel that strictjudicial+ control of the trial
process is critical because prosecutors cannot be trusted to consist-
ently follow the maxim that a prosecutor
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but thatjustice shall be done.
3'
Further, the lawmakers in Pessiville are concerned about the pros-
pects of wrongful convictions and are resolved to ensure that prison-
ers have meaningful opportunities to present their post-conviction
claims of innocence. And the governor of Pessiville finds wide public
support for his decisions to grant clemency to individuals he con-
cludes have been wrongly convicted.
Both Optiville and Pessiville are, of course, extreme paradigms.
The fifty states that makes up the United States fit in at various places
between these two extremes. Moreover, within these states, attitudes
often differ widely depending on the nature of a particular commu-
nity and its economic and racial makeup.3 2 So much turns, though,
on exactly where on the spectrum a particular community, juror,
31 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also MODEL RuLES OF PROFES-
SiONAL CoNouar Rule 3.8 (1989) (describing special responsibilities of prosecutors).
32 SeeJerome H. Skolnick, TheJuiy Was Never Meant To Be Rational LA TIMES, May 1,
1992, at 7 (arguing that juries from suburban, relatively prosperous and unicultural com-
munities are likely to hold very different perception of police than jurors from urban,
cosmopolitan, and multiculturl communities); See also Terence Moran, For Simi ValleyJurors,
Cop Credibility Was A Given, N.J. LJ.,June 15, 1992, at 17 ("How you think about things like
crime and cops in America depends to a large extent on where you live and, yes, what color
you are."); Poll Finds LA. Residents Believe Police Brutality Is Common, UPI, March 10, 1991,
available in Lexis, News Library, Wires File) (Among whites, 19% said police brutality was
very common and 39% said it was fairly common. Among Hispanics, 33% said it was very
common and 27% said it was fairly common. And among blacks, 44% said brutality was
very common and 36% said it was fairly common.).
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judge, legislator, or governor is located. Marginal changes in attitudes
about the possibility of wrongful prosecution and conviction can make
a world of difference in the attitudes that a juror takes toward the
evidence in a particular case, and whether thatjuror votes to acquit or
convict. So, too, marginal effects on judges, legislators, governors,
and the public can have a significant effect on these actors' willingness
to temper their "tough on crime" rhetoric with a willingness to be
tough on proving crime as well.
To explore this point, consider the roles of two groups of individ-
uals-jurors and politicians-in preventing or remedying wrongful
convictions. As will be seen, a strong case can be made that books like
In Spite of Innocence can serve important roles in helping these actors
appropriately define their roles.
A. JURORS
Every juror brings into the jury box a wide array of life exper-
iences and perceptions of reality. If that sense of reality leans a bit
toward the Optiville model, the juror will be prone to believe prosecu-
tion witnesses, trust the prosecutors' decision to prosecute, and be less
zealous in independently safeguarding the presumption of innocence.
By contrast, if the juror's sense of reality leans a bit toward the Pes-
siville model, the jury will treat testimony for the prosecution with
more skepticism, will not put much, if any, weight on the fact that the
prosecutors have charged the defendant, and will be far more zealous
in safeguarding the presumption of innocence.
A critical function of In Spite Of Innocence is to provide data to
help shape the public's perception of reality on issues relating to crim-
inal justice. Jurors evaluate evidence based on their sense of the
realm of what is possible. By recounting stories of wrongful convic-
tions, In Spite of Innocence serves to inform and remind everyone that:
police do lie at times; eyewitnesses do make mistaken identifications;
prosecutors do bring charges against innocent individuals; jurors and
judges do convict innocent people; and each person does have a role to
play in preventing these miscarriages of justice. This book is not
alone in playing that role. Films such as In The Name Of The Fathe
3
and The Thin Blue Line are also effective in publicizing the fact that the
justice system can and does convict innocent people.
34
33 Although the producers of In The Name Of The Father took much poetic license with
the facts of the case, the essence of the portrayal of the police conduct in the case is
accurate. See Alastair Logan, In The Name Of The Father (1994) (essay by one of the attor-
neys for the McGuire Seven).
34 There is room for this lesson in legal education as well. Stephan Landsman reports
that a number of law students who took his course on miscarriages ofjustice, or what he
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If members of the public are to play their roles as safeguards
against miscarriages of justice, they must be exposed to these stories
so that they understand that claims of factual innocence are not inher-
ently implausible. A juror who has read In Spite Of Innocence or has
seen The Thin Blue Line is in a better position to evaluate a defendant's
claim of innocence than a juror who has never been exposed to the
possibility of police and prosecutorial misconduct.
The Rodney King beating tapes are a good example of this point.
Assume that no videotape had ever been made of the beating, and
that Rodney King had simply called a press conference in the days
after the incident to tell the public about the horrors he had exper-
ienced. It seems rather clear that many people would dismiss his en-
tire account as a lie.3 5 They would have considered it unimaginable,
impossible, that police officers could have inflicted that kind of beat-
ing on an unarmed citizen.3 6 No matter how strong the physical evi-
dence might have been, these people would have rejected King's
allegation because it was too far from the realm of possibility that their
personal experiences would have allowed them to comprehend.
The tapes, of course, changed all of that. They changed many
people's sense of the possible, by exposing them to the fact that police
can act viciously.3 7 In doing so, the effects of the tapes went far be-
yond Rodney King's case. All across the country, prosecutors and de-
fense lawyers began reporting that jurors were treating police
testimony with newfound skepticism because the jurors no longer be-
lieved that police were beyond misconduct: the tapes seemed "to be
undermining jurors' traditional presumption in favor of police in civil
calls "satanic cases," reported that the course had shown them "how fragile the system
really is." See Stephan A. Landsman, Satanic Cases: A Means of Confronting the Law's Immoral-
ity, 66 NoTRE DAmE L. REv. 785, 799 (1991).
35 See Gary A. Hengstler, How Judges View Retrial of L.A. Cops, A.B-.J., Aug. 1993, at 70
(62% ofjudges polled believed that the two convicted officers at the federal trial would not
have been convicted without the videotape as evidence).
36 It is probable that part of the public's difficulty in accepting the possibility of police
misconduct is the horror that comes with that realization. It is a frightening prospect to
realize that virtually any police officer has the ability to claim that he saw illegal drugs on
the front seat of a car during a traffic stop, and that many jurors would convict on that
testimony alone. Or perhaps, as Stanley Milgren's experiments showed, "even when the
destructive effects of their work become patently clear, and they are asked to carry out
actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, relatively few people have
the resources needed to resist authority." STANLEY MILGREN, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHoarrv. A
EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 6 (1974).
37 Ironically, even though no one could deny that King had been beaten, the Simi
Valley jury that acquitted his attackers apparently did so based on their continuing pre-
sumptions about the integrity of the police. See Linda Deutsch, The Jury, The Media-and
the Riot:Jurors Toe 'The Thin Blue Line, CH. TRn., Apr. 30, 1992, at 8 ("The jury that acquit-
ted four Los Angeles police officers in the Rodney King beating heeded defense lawyers'
warnings that police are 'the thin blue line' separating the law-abiding from the lawless.").
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and criminal trials."38 As one Califomia judge put it: "[o]ne of the
standard questions is, 'Will you believe a police officer just because
he's a police officer?'... Usually people answer yes. Now you may get
the opposite response."
3 9
Of course, too much skepticism can be as bad as no skepticism at
all. If a juror is only exposed to stories of police and prosecutorial
mistake, misconduct, and perjury, and is led to believe that police
never tell the truth and that prosecutors never charge the guilty per-
son, then thatjuror's attitude toward police will distort the factfinding
process as much as the attitude of the juror who believes that police
and prosecutors never make mistakes and never engage in miscon-
duct. In Spite of Innocence does not seek to convince anyone that they
live in a Pessiville-like world. The point of the stories told in In Spite of
Innocence is not to convince anyone that there is a probability of error or
malice in any given case. The point is to convince people that there is
always a possibility of error or malice making its way into the system,
and that the public's job is to evaluate evidence fairly-not to rely on
general claims about police and prosecutors always or never acting
properly.
40
This message is sorely needed. A 1992 poll of people who sat on
juries found that twenty-eight percent of all jurors believe that a de-
38 See L.A. Beating Tape Affects Other Cases, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 25, 1991, at 12; see also 1993
Juries Show Doubts about Police, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 17, 1994, at S15 (quoting attorney who won
case against police as stating that "[tihe trend following the Rodney King case is that people
are a lot more sensitive to police issues .. ").
39 David Wharton, Opinions On King Case are Jeopardizing Prosecutions, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1991, at 1. Manyjuries are instructed not to value testimony of police officers more
than other witnesses, but, as Justice Jackson wrote, "[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers know to be unmiti-
gated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (citation omitted).
40 Another way of delivering this message would be to allow expert testimony about the
historical incidence of wrongful convictions and the kind of factors that are typically in-
volved in such cases. This is an approach that many have advocated with respect to expos--
ing the frailty of eyewitness testimony, and the courts are quite split on the admissibility of
expert testimony in that context. See generally CindyJ. O'Hagan, When Seeing is Not Believing:
The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEo. LJ. 741 (1993) (surveying literature and
caselaw).
In the mid-1980s, a number of courts allowed Michael Radelet (and a number of
others) to testify about wrongful convictions at capital sentencing hearings. See Michael L.
Radelet, Sociologists as Expert Witnesses in Capital Cases: A Case Study, in EXPERT WrrNESSES:
CRIMINOLOGIsrs IN THE COURTROOM 119 (Patrick R. Anderson & L. Thomas Winfree, Jr.
eds., 1987). In the three cases in which Radelet testified, the jury refused to impose the
death penalty. In one of those cases, a number ofjurors reported that the testimony about
erroneous convictions was responsible for their decision. Many other courts, however,
have refused to allow expert testimony on this subject. See id. at 127; People v. Pride, 833




fendant who is charged is either guilty or probably guilty,41 and forty-
two percent of white jurors and twenty-five percent of blackjurors said
that "in a conflict of testimony between a law enforcement officer and
a defendant, the law enforcement officer's [testimony] should be be-
lieved."42 These numbers are disturbing in their own right, but are
even more disturbing when one realizes how many of the respondents
must have agreed with these statements but refused to tell the pollster,
just as they must have refused to tell the judge or lawyer who asked
them about these points in voir dire.
The following true story reveals the nature of the problem. In
the summer of 1990,1 -was among the venire being chosen for a crimi-
nal trial at the infamous courthouse at 26th and California in Chi-
cago, Illinois. After the judge asked each of us a number of questions
about our backgrouiids and occupations, he asked whether we were
able to accept the presumption of innocence. Each of us told that
judge that we could. Later, while we were waiting to find out who
among us had been excused, one of the members of the venire asked
me why the "criminal" had a right to decide who should be on the
jury. I questioned her use of the term "criminal," explaining that it
would be the jury's job to decide if he was or was not a "criminal." She
responded honestly: "Honey," she said, "they don't charge 'em unless
they're guilty." This sentiment was, of course, diametrically opposite
of what she had told the judge just minutes earlier. Predictably,
though, she was chosen for the jury; I was excused.43 I am quite confi-
dent that this juror never read any articles or books about wrongful
convictions. I hope that she has a chance to pick up In Spite of Inno-
cence before she is next called to jury service.
B. POLITICIANS
Increased public recognition about the possibility of wrongful
convictions will not only have effects on the ways in which juries evalu-
ate evidence of guilt and innocence, but could have significant effects
41 Many Jurors ConsiderDeep Pockets and Ignore the Presumption of Innocence, NAT'L LJ., Feb.
22, 1993, at S12.
42 RacialDivide Affects Black, White Panelists, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 22, 1993, at S8. 51% of the
respondents disagreed with this statement. According to one expertjury consultant, "[t]hat
statistic... is unequivocally because of what happened in Rodney King." Id A bit of
reflection about that 51% figure is appropriate before one concludes, as one former prose-
cutor did, that the "figure speaks well for the defense. That 51% disagree is a good sign for
the defendant-that he has at least a 50-50 chance...." Id The fact that 51% of the
respondents were willing to weigh police and defendant's testimony without putting a
thumb on the scale is no great tribute to the fairness of the system. 100% of thejurors take
an oath and are instructed to do that.
43 When I informed the court of what she had said; she simply denied it. At that point,
however, the court excused her.
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on the public's-and hence elected officials'-attitudes toward many
issues surrounding the criminal justice system. For now, consider the
effect that public opinion might have on two important issues: judi-
cial procedures for considering claims of innocence and executive
clemency.
Senator Allen Simpson once summed up his attitude toward capi-
tal sentencing with these words: "let's fry 'em fast."44 He is, quite
clearly, not alone in this sentiment. Presidents Bush and Reagan
often complained about the delays in executing condemned prison-
ers, and President Clinton made this a recurring theme of his presi-
dential candidacy. 45 The call to stop the appeals and to get on with
the executions has become a central element in "tough on crime"
platforms at the federal, state, and local levels throughout the land.
These calls for closing the courts and starting the executions are
wildly popular. When a politician speaks of the fourteen years that
passed between the time that the state condemned John Wayne
Gacy46 and the time it executed him, many listeners develop a sense of
outrage. No one seemed to have held any serious doubts about Gacy's
guilt, and many see no point in the prolonged appellate process that
delayed Gacy's execution. Given Americans' current views on capital
punishment,47 this is an argument that anti-death-penalty advocates
are not about to win. A plea to keep the courts open so that people
like Gacy can raise technical legal arguments about their convictions
or sentences is not likely to garner much public support.
48
The effects of public focus on cases like Gacy can be potentially
devastating. In February 1994, a bill was introduced in the Illinois
Senate that would do away entirely with all post-conviction procedures
and habeas corpus for death row inmates in Illinois!49 Whether or
not this bill goes anywhere, its introduction provides strong evidence
44 Senator Allen Simpson quoted in Seymour Simon, What Price Justice? The Case Against
the Death Penalty, CHic. TRIB. SUN. MAG., Sep. 2, 1990, at 19.
45 See Presidential Hopefuls Discuss Habeas, Tort Reform, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 17, 1992, at 17
(discussing Clinton's approach); Clifford Krauss, Bush Threatens to Veto Crime Bill, Saying it's
Too Soft on Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1991, col. 1, at 1 (discussing Bush's views); Evan
Thomas, Reagan's Mr. Right; Rehnquist is Picked for the Court's Top Job, TIME, June 30, 1986, at
24 (discussing Reagan's views).
46 Gacy was convicted of killing 33 young men and boys. He was sentenced to death in,
1980 and was executed on May 10, 1994. See Gacy v. Wellborn, 994 F.2d 305, 306 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114S. Ct. 591 (1993); Illinois v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (1984), cert. denied;
470 U.S. 1037 (1985).
47 One recent poll found that 77% of Americans favor capital punishment. See Nancy
Gibbs, Laying Down the Law, TIME, Aug. 23, 1993, at 22.
48 See Eric Zorn, Execution Makes Sense-For Gacy, CH. TRn., Nov. 7, 1993, at BI (arguing
that focus on cases like Gacy takes attention away from hard cases).




about the extent to which focus on cases like Gacy's-and in the pub-
lic's mind most death row inmates are not very much different from
Gacy-can have on political debate.
This is why In Spite of Innocence can play such an important role in
the current debate over reforms to expedite executions and close off
avenues of appeal. In Spite of Innocence teaches that not every death
row inmate is aJohn Wayne Gacy. If the public can be convinced that
there is a risk that innocent people will be sentenced to death, then
there is some hope for preventing the courthouse doors from being
slammed so tight that they preclude consideration of non-frivolous
claims of factual innocence. Again, the risk of executing the innocent
may not be strong enough to convince the relevant decisionmakers to
do away with capital punishment completely. But it may be sufficient
to convince the public and its legislative bodies to take all reasonable
steps, short of abolishing the death penalty, to protect against execut-
ing the innocent.
For example, although the Crime Bill50 does not contain the pro-
vision, a bill supported by the Congressional Black Caucus, provides:
At any time, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a district
court shall issue habeas corpus relief on behalf of an applicant under
sentence of death, imposed either in Federal or in State court, who of-
fers credible newly discovered evidence which, had it been presented to
the trier of fact or sentencing authority at trial, would probably have
resulted in:
(1) an acquittal of the offense for which the death sentence was
imposed; or (2) a sentence other than death.51
The bill provides that an applicant who meets these standards is enti-
tled to have the court "order his or her release, unless a new trial or,
in an appropriate case, a new sentencing proceeding, is conducted
within a reasonable time."5 2 It is difficult to predict whether this pro-
posal will ever find its way into law. If it does, though, it will be be-
cause books like In Spite of Innocence have convinced enough people
that the problem of wrongful convictions is significant enough to jus-
tify judicial attention (and even to justify delay in executing some
prisoners).
Unless this type of provision for habeas corpus reform passes into
'50 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
.51 H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). See also S. 221, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
52 H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). Because it is limited to defendants sen-
tenced to death, this provision creates an interesting anomaly with respect to prisoners not
sentenced to death who have new evidence to prove their innocence. Nothing in this
pfovision entitles them to a day in court and they can be forced to live out life sentences
with no judicial mechanism for asserting their new evidence of innocence. One would
hope'that this anomaly would be cured by extending the right to a habeas corpus hearing
based on new evidence of innocence to all prisoners.
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law, however, the vast majority of prisoners who have new evidence to
support their innocence will continue to have no judicial forum in
which to seek relief.53 For these prisoners, their only hope is to seek
some form of executive clemency. As the Supreme Court explained
in Herrera: "Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradi-
tion of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of
justice where judicial process has been exhausted."54 Indeed, Chief
Justice Rehnquist approvingly cites In Spite of Innocence in support of
his assertion that " [r] ecent authority confirms that over the past cen-
tury clemency has been exercised frequently in capital cases in which
demonstrations of 'actual innocence' have been made."55
Whether one agrees with Chief Justice Rehnquist's position that
clemency can be an effective tool for addressing claims of innocence,
or with Justice Blackmun's view that the vindication of an innocent
defendant's rights should not be "made to turn on the unreviewable
discretion of an executive official or administrative tribunal,"56 one
53 Whether federal habeas remains open for some small class of death row inmates who
have overwhelming new evidence to prove their innocence remains an open question
based on the various opinions in Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). Justices White,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter most certainly believed that an individual facing capital
punishment is entitled to judicial consideration of new evidence to support a claim of
factual innocence. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring) ("I assume that a
persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial, even though made after the
expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence,
would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case."); id. at 882 (Black-
mun, J., with whom Stevens and Souter, JJ., join, dissenting) ("a truly persuasive demon-
stration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional"). It is unclear, though, whether a fifth vote will be forthcoming. The
other five justices in Herrerajoined an opinion assuming "for the sake of argument" that "a
truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the
execution of a defendant unconstitutional." Id. at 869 (per Rehnquist, C.J., with
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, I., joining). Two of the five who were willing to
assume this then wrote separately, however, explaining that notwithstanding their willing-
ness to join the majority opinion assuming that point for the sake of argument, they found
it "perfectly clear what the answer is: There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contem-
porary practice (if that were enough), for finding in the Constitution a right to demand
judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after
conviction." Id. at 874-75 (ScaliaJ., with whom Thomas,J.,joins, concurring). Two others
among the five, moreover, have joined an opinion warning that "[rlesolving the issue is
neither necessary nor advisable in this case. The question is a sensitive and, to say the least,
troubling one." Id. at 871 (O'Connor, J. & Kennedy, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 866.
55 Id. at 868. ChiefJustice Rehnquist uses this finding from In Spite of Innocence to sup-
port his position that clemency can be an effective tool in remedying miscarriages ofjus-
tice. Yet, when confronted with these scholars' other finding-that 23 innocent persons
this century have not been granted clemency and have been executed-the ChiefJustice
takes to questioning the worth of the study: "we note that scholars have taken issue with
this study. See Protecting The Innocent: A Response To The Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAq. L. REv.
121 (1988)." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 868 n.15.
56 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 881.
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thing remains certain: executive clemency is an intensely political
device.
Former Ohio Governor Michael DiSalle has written quite can-
didly about the clemency process:
The problem of getting at the truth is difficult enough. But when all the
elements in the decision have been examined and weighed, the execu-
tive still faces the pressures of practical politics. These pressures can be
resisted.., but they cannot be ignored.... Ignoring an application for
parole or commutation is bound to escape criticism. Releasing a con-
victed murderer, even after twenty years of honorable behavior and ap-
parent rehabilitation, is just as certain to arouse political hornets.
5 7
Governors are keenly sensitive to anticipated public reaction to par-
dons in death penalty cases. The political message of Willie Horton is
not easily forgotten, as is evidenced by the fact that so many grants of
executive clemency come from lame duck governors and presidents
who have no further political aspirations. 58
The potential political volatility of pardons means that those who
seek them are well advised to prepare the political landscape of public
opinion beforehand. If the public can be convinced that a miscar-
riage ofjustice has occurred in a particular case, then a governor con-
sidering a petition for clemency will not have to treat the petition as
an invitation to political suicide. In Spite of Innocence begins to sow
these seeds in the political landscape. Once the relevant public is con-
vinced, as they should be from this book, that miscarriages of justice
can occur, then half the battle has been won. The other half is to
convince the relevant public that a miscarriage ofjustice has occurred
in the particular case at issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Edwin Meese made his infamous statement that "if a person is
innocent of a crime, then he is not a suspect" in 1985-several years
before he, himself, became a suspect in the Wedtech investigation.59
Given his strong protestations of innocence in the Wedtech matter,
60
it seems safe to assume that Mr. Meese's views on the presumption of
57 MICHAEL V. DISALLE & LAwRENcE G. BLOCHMAN, THE POWER OF LIF OR DEATH 175-
76 (1965).
58 See Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork orDie: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 655,
.656 (1991) (discussing Ohio governor Richard Celeste's lame duck grants of clemency to
68 individuals); ToneyAnaya, Statement by ToneyAnaya on CapitalPunishment, 27 U. RICH. L.
REv. 177 (1993) (former New Mexico Governor Anaya discussed his pardons at the end of
his term).
,. 59 See generally JAMZs C. McKAY, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL in re Edwin
Mqsses, III (1988).
60 See, e.g., RonaldJ. Ostrow, Meese Blames 2 Ex-Aidesfor Causing Outside Probe, L-A. TiMES,
July 26, 1988, col. 1, at 1.
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innocence may have changed as a result of his personal ordeal. One
would also hope, though, that each and every American need not un-
dergo that sort of personal ordeal before he or she can appreciate the
constant risk that our criminal justice system will investigate, charge,
convict, sentence, and execute innocent people. In Spite of Innocence
provides the irrefutable evidence that miscarriages of justice can and
do happen. As Rubin "Hurricane" Carter has put it, though: "true
justice will never be achieved until those who have not been injured
become as outraged as those who have."
61
61 Address to Forum on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of
Law (February 7, 1994) (tape available at Northwestern University Law School Library).
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